Bread-and-butter politics: democratic disenchantment and everyday politics on an English council estate by Koch, Insa
 1 
Bread and butter politics: Democratic disenchantment and everyday politics on an English 
council estate 
Insa Koch 
 
Abstract: Despite evidence of widespread disenchantment with formal politics among 
England’s impoverished sectors, people on the margins continue to engage with elected 
representatives on their own terms. On English council estates (social housing projects), 
residents mediate their experiences of an alien and distant political system by drawing local 
politicians into localized networks of support and care. While this allows residents to voice 
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narratives for “alternative” democratic futures. 
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There is little doubt that growing numbers of citizens are disenchanted with formal politics in 
Great Britain. Mirroring a trend observed in other so-called advanced or established 
democracies across the Euro-American world (Braconnier and Dormagen 2014; Dalton 2004; 
Pharr, et al. 2000; Putnam 2004), British citizens have steadily turned their backs on political 
leaders and institutions. Public opinion polls demonstrate that many people have little faith in 
their elected representatives; that they do not identify with any of the major parties; and that 
they do not trust the government to act in their interests (Power Inquiry 2006). Similarly, 
membership in political parties and organizations has consistently declined: in 2001, 
membership in the three main parties was less than 25 per cent of the 1964 level. What is 
more, electoral participation has also dropped. Turnout for national elections in the UK fell 
from an all-time high of 83.9 per cent in 1950 to an all-time low of 59.4 per cent in 2001 
although it went up to 66.1 per cent in the most recent 2015 elections. Ethnic minorities and 
those from low socio-economic backgrounds are amongst the most likely to withdraw from 
electoral participation (Pattie, et al. 2004).  
Disenchantment with electoral politics does not mean that people stop engaging with their 
elected representatives. People on the margins mediate what they experience as a distant 
political system by vernacularizing politics in their own ways. England’s council estates offer 
a point in case. These estates are state-built housing developments for the working classes, 
although over decades many have become home to the poorest sectors of the population. On 
the estates where I carried out ethnographic fieldwork, residents are so profoundly alienated 
from the political system that they frequently describe politics as part of an alien world of 
“them” opposed to the “local community” or “us.” Yet residents continue to build personal 
relations with locally based politicians. Where the latter succeed in becoming active in 
localized networks of support and care that are central to residents’ daily struggles for 
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security and survival, fragile alliances between residents and politicians emerge on the back 
of which politicians can mobilize electoral support. 
An ethnographic focus on vernacular politics engages critically with ongoing concerns about 
the democratic crisis. Politicians, policy-makers and some academics tend to present popular 
disenchantment with politics in terms of narratives of civic crisis and voter apathy. Those 
who withdraw from electoral processes are blamed for their failure to exercise their duties as 
citizens at the ballot box. These portrayals, however, fail to acknowledge that people on the 
margins do not see voting as an exercise in abstract or depersonalized rights but as part of a 
personalized exchange relationship that is centered on politicians’ involvement in localized 
acts of support and the logic that governs them.  Where politicians fail to live up to the 
obligations inherent in such relationships, this can generate feelings of betrayal and electoral 
support is withdrawn. The limits of personalized politics provide an indication of the 
dismantling of the political left in the contemporary neo-liberal conjuncture. They also 
demonstrate the need to account for the lived realities of social class in aspirational narratives 
of “alternative” democratic futures (Hardt and Negri 2012; Juris 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 
2012).  
I conducted ethnographic fieldwork over eighteen months between 2009 and 2011 and for 
shorter periods since then up until 2015. During my initial fieldwork, I lived on two council 
estates in a single city, situated in the southeast, roughly an hour’s drive from London. While 
the city ranks amongst the wealthiest cities in the country, its council estates have been 
heavily affected by industrial decline and, like many other estates in the country (Rogaly and 
Taylor 2009), are stigmatized in the public imagination as places for the “underclass.” The 
bulk of my research was concentrated on an estate of roughly 11,000 residents of mainly 
white British descent but with a sizeable minority of people of Afro-Caribbean, African and 
increasingly Eastern European backgrounds. My research focused on those who see 
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themselves as “local residents” (who are mostly the residents of white British and Afro-
Caribbean descent) who have strong connections to the place, often through a family history 
tied to the city and its industrial history. The majority of them live in socially or privately 
rented housing on the estate as they cannot afford to become property-owners. They also 
count amongst the sector of the population that are most likely to withdraw from electoral 
participation (Pattie, et al. 2004).   
Crisis, democracy, and anthropology 
Across the political spectrum, politicians and policy makers have taken widespread voter 
withdrawal and declining political participation as evidence of a civic crisis that is affecting 
Britain. According to this view, popular disenchantment with the political system is 
symptomatic of a declining civic society. In the aftermath of the 2001 UK general elections, a 
House of Commons Select Committee stated: “we find it extraordinary that [the] collapse in 
electoral participation, put alongside other evidence on civic disengagement, has not been 
treated as a civic crisis demanding appropriate response” (House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee 2001). Policy makers across the political spectrum have 
suggested that to reinvigorate democracy, incentives to participate (such as through the 
introduction of compulsory voting) must be increased. This discourse of civic crisis bears 
resonance with modernist narratives in which prominent sociologists have lamented the 
alleged decline of social capital in late modern societies, and the ensuing apathy that is said to 
have replaced once close-knit communities and received forms of sociability and trust (e.g. 
Putnam 2004; Beck and Beck-Gernstein 2001). 
The narrative of civic decline offered by politicians, policy-makers, and sociologists ignores 
the ways in which the current moment is marked by what Nugent (2012) has referred to as 
the “dual crisis of global capitalism and representative democracy.” In the decades since 
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World War II, strong welfare policies and labor laws created the conditions for a relatively 
inclusive, if by no means equal, society.
1
 Large sections of the working and middle class 
population were still “captured” by mainstream politics (Nugent 2012). Since the late 1970s, 
however, successive conservative governments and their turn to neo-liberal policies have 
marginalized the voices of ordinary citizens. As Razsa and Kurnik, drawing on the work of 
Butler, have put it: “in the face of global economic crisis and calls for ever-greater austerity, 
the narrowed scope of liberal democracy has meant that even the most basic pleas for shelter, 
food and employment [become] impossible demands” (2012, 239). Meanwhile, politicians 
are ever more tightly imbricated with corporate elites as campaign finance and corporate 
lobbying have become the most influential factors in political decision-making (Crouch 
2004). 
Political theorists and sociologists have described the crisis as indicative of  the emergence of 
a “post-democratic” (Crouch 2004) or “post-political” (Ranciere 1999) state. This does not  
imply that democracy was ever a reality as the pre-fix “post” in “post-democracy” may 
suggest (Ramsay 2013, 13). Private property interests were at the heart of liberal democracy 
from its inception (Hardt and Negri 2011). However, as Nugent has pointed out, if “economic 
elites have always been in a position to capture the political domain […] the manner in which 
they have done so, and the relationships they have established with subordinate groups in the 
process, has changed through time” (2012, 181). Democracy today seems to have become a 
personal attribute of the privileged few (Friedmann 2003, 28). Friedmann describes a 
bifurcation that has taken place whereby politicians celebrate the transnational solidarity of 
an international community that endorses hybridity and multiculturalism as a marker of 
identity and inclusion (2003; see also Friedmann and Friedmann 2013). By contrast, public 
discourses about the  “underclass” in the UK and the US (Wacquant 2009; Welshman 2006), 
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the “marginal mass” in Brazil (Perlman 2010), and “internal orientalism” in Eastern Europe 
degrade the working classes as a political group (Kalb 2009).  
New actors have come to fill the gap that has opened up between the people left behind and 
political elites. As Kalb (2009, 208) says “actual outcomes on local grounds are 
intermediated by various path-dependent ‘critical junctions’ that link global processes via 
particular national arenas and local histories, often hidden, to emergent and situated events 
and narratives” (see also Kalb 2011). “Critical junctions” include the rise of populist working 
class parties across Europe and beyond (Braconnier and Mayer 2015; Friedmann 2003; 
Gingrich and Banks 2005). These movements capitalize on widespread feelings of anxiety 
and paranoia by those on the margins through inverting the discourse of cosmopolitanism 
deployed by elites and through relying on a language of rootedness. In this process, they 
often appeal to a far right rhetoric that mobilizes tropes of victimhood along nationalist, 
ethnic or radically local lines. In the UK, the far-right British National Party (BNP) (and in 
the lead up to the 2015 General Elections, the far-right, anti-European United Kingdom 
Independence Party - UKIP) has captured votes among the white working classes by 
mobilizing a language of ethnic victimhood that presents immigrants and members of ethnic 
and racial minority groups as the beneficiaries of preferential treatment on the part of the 
state (see also Cohen 1996; Evans 2012; Rhodes 2011; Smith 2012a). 
My ethnographic research on the council estate focused on a local independent party that was 
active on the estate from 2002 to 2012, the Free Worker’s Party (FWP).2 The FWP was in 
many ways a typical populist working class party: it rejected both the policies of meritocracy 
and multiculturalism at the heart of the New Labour government and the politics of the local 
Labour party that dominated the city where the FWP became active. But the FWP also saw 
itself as a left-wing alternative to the far right, in particular to the BNP, as it objected to their 
ethnic identity politics and instead aspired to build a movement based on solidarity and class 
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consciousness. It attempted this through a strategy of “bread and butter” – an approach that 
focused on residents’ daily needs and the localized networks through which residents 
addressed them. The term “bread and butter” was coined by one of the party’s supporters 
when once describing the party’s activities to me, but I should be clear that party members 
did not officially endorse the term, nor would they necessarily say that “bread and butter” 
was the end goal of their political mission.
3
 It was, however, central to the party’s initial 
electoral success among residents on the estates. 
By tracing the electoral rise and fall of the party, I reflect on how people engage with voting, 
and by extension with politics, as vernacular processes, that is to say as processes that take on 
locally-specific meanings (Banerjee 2011; Coles 2004; Grisaffi 2013; Paley 2008; Spencer 
1997). On the estate, people “tame” what they experience as an alien and distant political 
system by building personalized relations with politicians that are co-extensive with their 
own logics of mutual support and care. Nonetheless personalized politics rarely translate into 
a platform for collective action as they struggle to attain legitimacy in the public sphere. 
Ultimately the failure of local politicians to establish themselves as credible alternatives 
sheds light on the precariousness of working class movements at a time when political elites 
have narrowed the meaning of democracy and dismantled the infrastructural and political 
framework that legitimated working class voices. It also complicates aspirational narratives 
of “alternative” democratic futures which have highlighted the need to break with received 
forms of representative democracy (Hardt and Negri 2011; Juris 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 
2012) by emphasizing the need to engage more critically with the material realities of social 
class.  
The rise and fall of independent politics on an English council estate  
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“People start to see you as part of the system you’re trying to change.” These were the words 
of Tony Smith, the last remaining FWP city councilor, in a 2012 interview with the local 
newspaper, three months before stepping down from political office. Smith was describing 
the rise and fall of the FWP on the estate where I conducted fieldwork, and to a lesser extent 
two other estates in the same city. The FWP’s electoral history in the city had begun over a 
decade before in May 2002, when Smith had been elected in the municipal elections as the 
first FWP councilor to the city council board. The party’s initial objective had been to 
mobilize electoral support by running in local authority elections before trying for MP 
positions in the general elections.
4
 To this effect, the party had formed groups in various 
cities across the country as well as in Scotland from the late 1990s onwards, and started 
launching a series of pilot projects in working class post-industrial neighborhoods. 
FWP’s founders, a small group of self-proclaimed working class people, sought to create an 
alternative to the major political parties. Although they had no explicit affiliation with any 
existing left parties, many of the members had been active in earlier anti-fascist and anti-
capitalist movements. The FWP’s opposition was directed against the Labour Party which the 
FWP felt had “ditched the working class” with its politics of multiculturalism and 
meritocracy that became central to its third way politics upon being elected into government 
in 1997. It also feared that the far right, crucially the BNP, would fill the void created by the 
Labour Party’s abandonment of the working class through its rhetoric of victimhood that saw 
ethnic and racial minorities as benefiting from preferential treatment at the expense of their 
white British counterparts. To provide a credible working class alternative, the FWP reasoned 
that a movement must be built from the bottom-up through localized working class 
mobilization that took seriously the needs of ordinary working class people. 
The party had singled out the estate where I worked as a favorable place to pursue its politics: 
electoral turn out for both general and local elections had been low for decades, falling to 
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levels of twenty per cent for local elections prior to the FWP becoming active.
5
 Historically, 
the estate had been Labour Party heartland. The local Labour MP had represented his 
constituency in Parliament for over thirty years. His wife was also active in local governance 
and was a Labour councilor. Yet many residents had little respect for the Labour Party. Those 
who voted for Labour tended to do so not because of the MP and his wife’s party affiliation 
but because they considered them to be “locals” who could relate to the estate and its people. 
People told me that they “do not believe in Labour” but that they trusted their MP because of 
the work that he had put into the estate over the years.  
It was against this backdrop that the FWP organized a series of grassroots campaigns led by 
Tony Smith, himself a local resident, former auto worker, and later bus driver. Smith’s first 
campaign centered on issues of crime and drug dealers’ anti-social behavior. He and his 
supporters argued that the local authorities and political establishment had long ignored 
serious problems on the estate such as open drug dealing, intimidation, and violence 
committed at the hands of a few. Challenging what they called a policy of “contain and 
control”, Smith and his supporters organized public meetings and pressured the police to 
arrest and evict drug dealers from their homes. They also began patrolling the neighborhoods, 
organized pickets outside the houses of well-known drug dealers, and collected their own 
CCTV evidence. In other neighborhoods, campaigning activities focused on the lack of 
adequate educational facilities and tenants’ rights. Considerable canvassing accompanied the 
activities as party members and their family and friends went door-to-door in the lead up to 
elections.  
Smith was the first FWP member to be voted onto the city council in 2002. Three more 
councilors, from Smith’s estate and two other estates in city, were elected into city councilor 
positions in the next years. Together, they took four of forty-eight seats in the city council by 
2005. While this was only a modest success for the FWP, the electoral turn out for local 
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elections rose from 20 per cent to nearly 30 per cent during these years, a rise in electoral 
participation which could arguably be attributed to the FWP’s organizing work. The FWP 
also contested the general elections in 2005, taking votes away from the Labour Party even if 
they failed to acquire a seat. This initial success made the FWP optimistic that it was on the 
way to mobilizing a working class movement. However, over subsequent years, the party 
never managed to expand its support base,  nor maintain its seats in the local council. By 
2012, ten years after the party had first been voted into the local council, it had lost all its 
seats.  
What explains the rise and fall of the FWP? How, in a climate of widespread withdrawal 
from electoral politics, did the FWP manage to mobilize electoral support? And why did the 
party fail to succeed in building a movement? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
move away from a sole focus on the ballot box to an understanding of how politics is 
embedded in broader dynamics of social life. In an environment marked by deep 
disillusionment with representative democracy, the challenge that the FWP faced was how to 
transcend a deeply felt divide between the world of formal politics and that of everyday life. 
While the FWP’s initial electoral success reflected its ability to become embedded in 
localized exchange relations through its pursuit of a “bread and butter” politics, the party was 
ultimately unable to maintain the obligations that followed from such an alliance, thereby 
engendering yet further electoral withdrawal and reinforcing democratic disenchantment.   
Democratic disenchantment  
The history of post-war British council estates is a history of gradual economic and political 
dispossession: of how inhabitants have been progressively deprived of their material 
livelihoods and the political channels that represented them. The estate where I conducted 
fieldwork provides an excellent example of these changes. It was built in the 1950s and 1960s 
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to provide housing for the city’s working class. Many people had migrated to the city, both 
from other parts of the country as well as Britain’s former colonies (mainly the West Indies), 
in search of work at the local car factory where working conditions were unstable but wages 
were high. Housing policies favored what were then called the “respectable” working classes: 
to be eligible for council housing, prospective residents frequently had to provide proof of 
income as council rents still tended to be higher than in the private rental market.
6
 
Paternalistic forms of rent and housing management control were common in the early days 
of post-war council housing as council tenants were carefully policed by a plethora of state 
officials, including social workers, housing officers, and rent collectors (Ravetz 2001). 
Industrial decline and neo-liberal reform since the Thatcher years has had profound effects on 
council estates and working class lives across the country (Hanley 2007; Rogaly and Taylor 
2009). In the city where I worked, the car factory had started undergoing tumultuous periods 
of restructuring by the mid-1980s. At the time of my fieldwork, the factory employed a mere 
fraction of its original labor force, with many of its workers hired on short-term contracts. 
The rise of an increasingly service-oriented economy has not created sufficient replacement 
jobs for a local population largely without higher educational qualifications. Local 
unemployment hovers around twenty per cent, and people are trapped in poorly paid jobs as 
cooks, drivers, shop assistants, or cleaners. The estate has also been affected by the 
privatization of the social housing sector, introduced by the “Right to Buy” legislation in 
1980 which permitted existing council tenants to buy their houses below market value. 
Today, nearly fifty per cent of the houses on the estate are privately owned. Residents who 
cannot afford to buy are forced to compete over ever more scarce social housing, with many 
being pushed into an insecure and over-priced private rental market.  
Economic dispossession has been matched by political dispossession. The neo-liberal 
restructuring under the Thatcher years “paled in comparison with what was perceived to be 
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the abandonment of its traditional supporters by the Labour Party” (Evans 2012: 26). Central 
to this betrayal was the shift to the New Labour government’s third way politics in the mid-
1990s, whose emphasis on multiculturalism, meritocracy, and the expansion of the middle 
classes left the working classes without a viable political voice. On the estate, most people 
expressed the feelings of abandonment that Evans and others have recorded (Mollona 2009; 
Smith 2012a; Smith 2012b). Some people over 50 told me that they had “always been Labour 
and always would be.” But for others, particularly younger people, this rule no longer applies. 
Brian, a former car worker in his forties, summed up the feelings of many: “I’m not gonna 
vote Labour just ‘cos our parents have voted Labour and before them, their parents voted 
Labour. Labour means nothing to me.”  
In such a context of widespread disenchantment, residents felt that their elected 
representatives failed to be accountable to ordinary people and their needs. “Democracy 
means nothing when you are uneducated and poor,” a local resident in his fifties told me 
rather prosaically. People often spoke about politicians in terms of a contrast between “us” 
and “them.” “It’s like they are just part of ‘them’,” a local woman in her late thirties 
explained, “they have nothing to do with ‘us’.” This vernacular was also elaborated in 
narratives about the hidden dealings of state power: politicians were often portrayed as 
individuals who strike deals behind closed doors to enrich themselves at the expense of 
ordinary people. Tracey, a woman of Afro-Caribbean descent in her early forties who was 
widely respected in the neighborhood because of her long-standing leadership of a local 
informal drop in center told me:  
“It’s all good and well if you do local politics for the people here, if you do all the bits and 
pieces. But the higher you get, that’s where the challenge comes. Look at the expenses 
scandal and what happened there.
7
  Parliament is structured in such a way that you have to do 
certain things [and] you to become like them. Once you got your feet under the table, well, 
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you know, a lot of them politicians, they think ‘Oh, it’s really comfortable here’, and they 
change, and they don’t care about us.”  
Given such widespread mistrust in the formal political system, withdrawal from electoral 
politics became for many residents a reasonable and a socially expected response.  “Why 
should I vote?” a resident in her late forties asked me defiantly when I pressed her, “They just 
do what they want, so there’s no point in me voting!” The same logic also applied to 
participation in political organizations, principally trade unions, which most residents 
considered to be merely “closed shops.” People also made conscious efforts to keep politics 
away from their everyday life. For instance, it was considered rude to “talk politics” in social 
settings, particularly in the pub or in people’s homes, and when I tried to raise political issues 
in these settings, people often claimed that they did not “know anything” or didn’t “want 
anything to do with politics.” Lindsey, a local resident in her late thirties and a mother of 
three, recalled an episode from her childhood in the following words: 
“I remember, going back to my childhood, that one election when my mum was watching 
TV. My mum, she was in a nightie and having a drink and watching Inspector Morse or 
whatever she was watching on TV [when] these politicians knocked on the door and even 
offered to give her a lift to the polling station. And my mum said: ‘I’m not voting ‘cos I’m 
not well' [...]. And she was so annoyed that they tried to pick her up and give her a lift, and 
she was like: ‘How dare these people’…!” 
In short, many residents have come to associate politics with a world of hostile and corrupt 
dealings that lacks legitimacy. This, then, is how residents experience democracy: as a failure 
on the part of politicians to be accountable to the needs of the common people and those of 
their estate. This raises the paradox of how, within such a context of widespread 
disillusionment, the FWP managed to mobilize electoral support.  
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Bread and Butter Politics 
Council estates are often portrayed in the media and popular culture as places of social 
breakdown and decay. Although daily life is marked by precariousness and danger, support 
networks run strong: it is often precisely through the support of kin, friends and neighbors 
that people get by and make ends meet (Koch 2015; see Edwards 2000; Mollona 2009; 
MacKenzie 2013; Skeggs 2004). Daily life is organized around an idea of “give and take” 
that takes the form of Maussian relations of exchange. For example, women rely on the 
support of kin and friends (who are often fictive kin) by sharing child care duties, lending and 
borrowing money from one another, and sometimes sharing housing for extended periods of 
time. Similarly, in dealing with local crime, dormant networks of neighbor relations spring to 
life as people call on each other for effective protection and informal policing of their 
neighborhood. For example, Tony Smith had once dealt with a local drug dealer who was 
intimidating his wife and children by mobilizing neighbors and friends to “gang up” outside 
the drug dealer’s house. “Ours is a world where you do or get done,” he said when explaining 
how he and his allies had confronted the neighbor.   
Some white working class people in England are known to lament the arrival of, and 
perceived threats from, non-white and sometimes non-British residents (Dench et. al 2006; 
Evans 2012; Smith 2012a; Rhodes 2012). But the presence of these narratives does not 
overshadow the extreme fluidity across groups as people have adapted to the realities of a 
post-colonial Britain (McKenzie 2013; Rogaly and Taylor 2009; Tyler 2015). On the estate 
where I worked, many young people grow up as the mixed-race children of white and black 
Afro-Caribbean parents, and friendship relations between the two groups run deep. Residents 
of Afro-Caribbean descent assume prominent positions in the local community, for example, 
Tracey, introduced above, who ran the community center with great charisma. She and others 
took pride in promoting their Caribbean lifestyle, including food (jerk chicken and rice and 
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peas) and music (reggae) as part of what it means to be “local.” By contrast, people were 
often less willing to appropriate as “local” the practices of other immigrant groups, including 
South Asians (although their presence in the city was strong). One reason for this could be 
that historically migrants from South Asian backgrounds had moved to other neighborhoods 
in the same city and there are comparatively speaking few of them living on the estate today.   
The chief criterion for distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, or between the “us” and 
“them.” is not along racial and ethnic lines but rather according to a distinction between 
“locals” and “non-locals.” To be “local” means to be embedded in the localized relations of 
support and care, and to be able to claim loyalty to particular individuals, families, as well as 
to the places that they inhabit (Degnen 2013). In this respect, people attribute foreignness or 
difference to those who they do not consider “local,” while emphasizing similarity and 
connectedness with reference to those they know. For example, in my own experience, it was 
only by investing time into relations with residents at the local community center where I was 
based and by partaking in my host families’ daily life that my status gradually changed from 
being a “researcher” or “student” to being a “local resident,” a “friend,” or even fictive 
“member of the family.” But the point does not only apply to anthropologists. Crucially, 
anyone otherwise associated with the world of “them” can be appropriated into the “us” by 
proving themselves through their actions. A particular housing officer or a council worker 
can be considered “one of us” if they have made an effort to get to know residents and to 
integrate themselves into local life (Koch 2014). 
Understanding these processes of personalization is crucial when it comes to analyzing the 
role of locally based politicians. As Heredia and Palmeira (2013) argue in the context of 
Brazil, politics is not limited to the ballot box but takes place through personalized relations 
that unfold between politicians and people outside of “politics time,” understood as the period 
of political campaigns and elections. When asking residents what they expect from their 
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politicians, I was told that they sought somebody who “cared for the local community” or 
“who was involved.” To be involved meant to be present in people’s lives, to take an active 
interest in and to show support for the needs of residents and their estate. It was precisely 
these qualities that were embodied by the local Labour MP and his wife who, through their 
continued residence on the estate over decades and their long-standing engagement in local 
neighborhood life, had earned the respect of many. Jane, a resident in her late thirties 
expressed the importance of local involvement:  
“OK right, so I could sit here and moan all day and be depressed and hope that one day when 
there’s been a revolution, my life’s gonna change and everything’s gonna be better. Well, 
that’s a whole load of risks to take, and in the meantime, nothing would have happened that 
would’ve made a difference to what I actually want: I want my own house, with a nice carpet, 
I want a cooker that actually works and I want the opportunity to go on holiday once a year, 
that’s what I want.” 
Jane also mentioned that it was more important to vote in local elections than to vote in 
general elections because “they are more relevant to my life.” This is a point I heard many 
times, although the term “local” elections could, rather confusingly, be used to refer to 
general elections where people were speaking about “their” local MP. 
It is against this backdrop that we have to understand how the FWP managed to mobilize 
electoral support. The efficacy of its “bread and butter” politics resided precisely in the extent 
to which it became active in residents’ daily pursuits for security and protection. The party 
achieved this in two ways. First, the FWP took on important bridging functions in residents’ 
struggles with the authorities and other formal bodies. These resembled the brokerage politics 
frequently observed on the margins (Alexander 2000; Auyero 2000; James 2011; Lazar 
2004). For instance, when addressing drug dealing, the party pressured the police and 
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complained to the council. The same approach was adopted with the government-funded 
employment agency and social security office (Jobcentre Plus), employers, and other 
institutions. What is more, the FWP went beyond its brokerage roles by claiming 
enforcement powers, in relation to drug trafficking, thereby assuming state-like functions. 
One resident, commenting on the charges of “vigilantism” that the FWP had been accused of 
by the local authorities, told me:  
“Well, yeah, some people say they were vigilantes, and why not? Near where I live there was 
a drug den. And nobody would do anything about it. Basically, what you got to do is smash 
in the door, shut the place down, kick them bastards out. But it took [the local authorities] 
bloody months, and months and months! And then [Tony Smith] came along, and he really 
helped to get things moving.” 
Second, the FWP was active in residents’ everyday networks of sociality. As Lazar (2004) 
has pointed out in relation to political clientelism in Bolivia, to understand how rapport is 
established between politicians and citizens, we need to pay attention to the affective or non-
instrumental aspects of politics. Tony Smith, who was born in the city and who had worked 
there most of his life, was widely known as a neighbor, family member, and resident. He was 
already integrated into local life before he started working there politically. When Smith 
invited me to stay with him, his wife, and two children in their small two-bedroom socially 
rented tenancy, I saw friends pop over for tea, neighbors bringing over left-over food from 
Sunday roast dinners, and residents stopping to chat on the street. Smith and his party also 
organized various outings, leisure activities, and sports tournaments for the party’s own 
athletics club during which the ethics of sharing that was so central to community life was 
enacted.  
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It was precisely by becoming part of daily life on the estate that the FWP mobilized electoral 
support as part of reciprocal exchange relationships. Some of that support stemmed from 
people who had built similar relations with the local Labor MP. But the majority of votes the 
FWP received, Smith told me, were from first-time voters who knew members of the party or 
felt inspired by the FWP’s activities. In conversations I had with FWP supporters, one of the 
things that residents most valued about the party was precisely that it looked nothing like the 
established parties. In the words of one resident, the FWP “are different from politicians” 
because “they don’t do politics” or because “they aren’t politicians.” Tony Smith was 
repeatedly presented as a “community person” or a “people’s person.” Yet other people 
referred to the FWP as a “localist” party, identifying the party with the estate itself. Indeed, 
the FWP’s wider political discourse of creating a national working class movement was 
simply ignored by the majority of residents or even dismissed as “bad rhetoric.” As Tony 
Smith said, echoing the voices of many residents who had voted for him:  
“I guarantee if you go to people on the doorstep on this estate – let’s concentrate on the 
thousand people that voted for us – you [will] get about a thousand views of what the FWP is 
about. The majority don’t really understand where we are coming from, but a lot of people 
think we are a localist party; they think we’re good because we dealt with the drug dealers 
and that. People think of us as the good gangsters from next door. Most people don’t do 
politics, and if you don’t listen to politics, you don’t know.” 
It is important to point out that while residents voted for the FWP because of their personal 
ties with Smith or the party, not every supporter had personally benefited from their 
interventions. Rather, while not having met or interacted with Smith and his party, some had 
friends, neighbors, or kin who had talked about their local activities on the estate. As 
Braconnier et al. argue in the context of a poor Brazilian neighborhood, electoral choices do 
not have to be the result of dyadic relationships between individuals and their elected 
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representatives (2013, 45). People sometimes intended to vote for Smith and his party not 
because they had personally encountered the FWP but because their vote signified an act of 
loyalty to their friends or kin. One resident explained: “I voted for Smith ‘cos my friends told 
me I should.” There were also others who voted for Smith as an act of loyalty to the estate 
itself: “I voted for them ‘cos they were a local party, they were for people from this estate,” 
another resident told me.  
To sum up, the FWP mobilized support on the estate by practicing a vernacular form of 
politics: one that derived its legitimacy not from its association with the formal political 
system but rather from its submission to local networks and their logic of support and care. In 
this process, voting can be understood not as an exercise in abstract or depersonalized rights, 
but rather as part of a personalized exchange relationship. And yet, six years after having four 
councilors elected to the city council, the FWP had lost all of its seats. This raises the 
question of what caused the downfall of the party.  
Betrayal 
In his analysis of the gift, Mauss (1992) demonstrated that exchange locks people into on-
going relations of debt: each act is only one instance of a whole web of rights and obligations 
as people are expected to reciprocate an act of favour rendered to them in the future. Among 
residents on the estate, there was a strong expectation that relations carry commitments over 
time. This also brought the possibility of being let down as an ever-present threat. One of the 
most common, but also severe, insults was to accuse someone of being “selfish” and of 
exploiting one’s own kindness. On the estate, where life was marked by the unpredictability 
of material hardship, the scope for such accusations was wide. Proving one’s loyalty or 
commitment could be onerous: requests for sharing money and housing could easily place 
individuals on the verge of financial ruin, or force them to make difficult decisions between 
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helping family and placing themselves in conflict with social welfare agencies and the law. 
For example, on several occasions, I observed women feeling pressured to put up a partner or 
a grown up child even where this led to breaking official rules that provided benefits only to 
the sole occupier of a home (Koch 2015).  
Just as people fear betrayal by family and friends, they also have high expectations of 
individual state officials and politicians who they have established relationships with. As 
people often told me, they were “tired” and “sick” of outsiders who “come into the local 
community, do their bit and then leave again” (an accusation that I, as an anthropologist, was 
not immune to). I quickly recognized the fragility of such relations. In the many cases I 
witnessed, people felt that individual state officials had failed to attend to their needs or 
requests for help. These officials were described as “traitors” or sometimes as “criminals” 
and “crooks” who had turned out to be “no better than the rest.” Local politicians too were 
expected to work hard to maintain support over time. People I spoke to emphasized that 
politicians need to “earn their votes” and that they had to “deserve” the support from local 
people. One local resident who, in the past had run for local councilor, when I asked why 
people should vote for him, said: “…because I’ve lived on this estate for so long. And I’ve 
done so much for this estate. I’m not a politician, I’m from this estate.”  
Against this backdrop, the FWP struggled to live up to its perceived obligations. Local 
authorities and the Labour Party actively resisted the FWP’s aggressive opposition to the 
local establishment. Housing officers and council officials reported to me how “angry” and 
“hostile” the FWP had been, sometimes taking this as evidence of their “anti-authority” and 
“anti-democratic” thinking. They also labeled the party’s policing activities of local drug 
dealers and anti-social tenants as “vigilantism” and “witch hunt politics” intended to cause 
the “downfall” of a few select individuals living on the estates. But it was not just the party’s 
campaigning activities on the grassroots level that were under attack: the authorities called 
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into question the integrity of the FWP’s politics itself. In council meetings, letters published 
in the press, and in its own print media, some members of the Labour Party accused Tony 
Smith and other FWP members of links to anarchist and violent Irish nationalist groups, 
while others denounced the FWP’s opposition to Labour’s identity politics and policy of 
multiculturalism as “racist.” 
The public onslaught might not have been so damaging had the party commanded larger 
resources and a greater presence in the public sphere. But the FWP had very limited resources 
and institutional support. Tony Smith and other FWP councilors recalled how the public 
accusations of racism, vigilantism, and extremist links all acted to delegitimize the FWP. 
When the party attempted to respond to these accusations in their own print magazines, the 
web and even through legal action by charging the Labour Party with libel, much of the 
councilors’ time was taken up by defensive actions. Meanwhile, they struggled to influence 
decisions in the town hall. Smith reported that he felt heavily victimized in meetings as FWP 
proposals were routinely blocked and the party’s positions outvoted, leaving it unable to 
deliver on the changes they had promised. In the lead-up to local elections, the party 
struggled to keep up with increased Labour Party canvassing initiated after the FWP’s early 
electoral success. A member of the FWP described the difficulties:  
“I used to have faith in [the FWP]; at one stage we had four councilors. And then we got 
absolutely annihilated by Labour. And what’s more, they get students in and they canvass and 
they do it for a living. But we have to work full-time and fill it all in. And then you are in 
council and you’re being outvoted all the time. And after these years, the people who’ve been 
voting for you say ‘You’re not getting anywhere’ and then people lose faith in you and you 
lose them forever.” 
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This quote makes clear that there was a direct link between the FWP’s struggles to establish 
itself as political party and its subsequent loss of support. When speaking to residents about 
the FWP, I was often told of the hard work that Tony Smith and the party had done for people 
on the estate. Many said that they “did not know what had happened to the party” or that they 
were not sure “where they had gone.” But others were more forthcoming in their criticism: 
for them, the FWP’s inability to deliver, let alone expand on its initial activities, amounted to 
a personal betrayal. The FWP’s work had raised their expectations that they would be 
different from the other parties. Mandy, a resident in her forties, felt that they had turned out 
to be “no better than the rest”: she told me that the party had just “sort of disappeared like all 
the others who come and go.” In a subsequent conversation, she reiterated some of the public 
allegations against the party, telling me that she did not like how the FWP had “caused the 
downfall of particular people on the estate,” and that they had been “a bit racist” for targeting 
black drug dealers. 
Ironically, the FWP’s short-lived history on the estate may have had the opposite effect from 
what it had intended to achieve: far from radicalizing local people and building a working 
class movement, it may well have ended up reinforcing widespread disenfranchisement and 
anxiety. It is in this sense that we have to understand the statement made by Tony Smith at 
the beginning of this article that “people start to see you as part of the system you’re trying to 
change.” Claire, a local woman in her thirties, told me that she used to vote for a “localist 
party round here” (the FWP) but had no intentions to vote again in the run-up to the general 
elections in 2010 because it had not “gone anywhere.” She was extrapolating from her 
experience with local councilors to the general elections. But abstention was not the only 
consequence of perceived betrayal: Smith and some other FWP supporters also worried that 
residents might turn to far right politics, notably the British National Party (BNP), which 
experienced a resurgence of popular support in other post-industrial neighborhoods in the 
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2000s. Smith once said that in the future, “they could easily pull off an electoral success.” He 
explained:  
“Look, in other places, they are just getting more and more votes because ... people look at 
their policies and say, seventy per cent of their policies most people would agree with.
8
 And 
people on this estate and places like that, they don’t look at that other thirty per cent; they 
look at all them things that go on that affect them on their estate, and that’s why they are 
gonna vote for them and they don’t see the bad side, they are only looking at the bits that are 
affecting them. And if [the BNP] come to places like [this estate], they’ll get their votes here 
too.... And if there isn’t any counterweight to what they’re saying, if [the FWP] shouldn’t be 
around anymore, then they’ll get all the votes.” 
Contrary to Smith’s expectations, at the time of writing, the BNP has fallen back into decline. 
However the possibility of right-wing populism has not disappeared: the BNP has been 
superseded by UKIP, the UK’s most recent anti-European and nationalist party. In the 2015 
general elections, in the local constituency encompassing the estate, UKIP obtained 6.8% of 
the total votes (while the local Labour MP won a majority of 50%). UKIP’s presence in the 
British political landscape illustrates that the social insecurity and anger felt by 
disenfranchised populations energizes popular receptiveness to ideologies of racial or ethnic 
nationalism (Kalb 2009, 2011; see also Braconnier and Mayer 2015). 
The threat of UKIP achieving a lasting breakthrough on the estate should be considered 
against two potential drawbacks. First, it needs to succeed at making a discursive jump 
between the lived reality of fluid racial relations and the party’s own narrative of national 
victimhood. Second, it would have to master the challenge that confronted the FWP: that of 
earning loyalty through the pursuit of a “bread and butter” politics as well as maintaining 
such loyalty over time. UKIP’s more established position in mainstream politics and its voice 
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in the public sphere may place it at an advantage compared to the FWP, but it remains to be 
seen if they will succeed in mobilizing electoral support on the estate. 
Conclusion: personalized politics and “alternative” democratic futures 
The electoral history of the Free Workers Party sheds light on how people on the margins 
engage with electoral politics under conditions of sustained disenchantment with their elected 
representatives. While the FWP was ultimately committed to setting up a class-based 
movement, its means of mobilizing a largely apathetic electorate were very different from 
this long-term goal: its campaigning strategies were focused on the pursuit of a “bread and 
butter” politics that emphasized the need to address the immediate and everyday concerns of 
residents on the estates. By pursuing a politics of brokerage and by assuming, to limited 
extent, state functions themselves, the FWP managed to mobilize electoral support. At the 
same time, however, the party quickly lost its seats as it failed to establish itself as a political 
alternative. This failure was due to the de-legitimization of the FWP because of the onslaught 
the party faced from the city’s establishment and its own limited resources in the face of it. 
For residents, the party’s inability to attend to their needs, let alone expand on their initial 
activities, amounted to prove that they were ultimately no better than the rest.  
The FWP’s failure to establish itself as a political alternative is not evidence of the 
insufficiencies or weaknesses of “bread and butter” politics. The strength of this political 
approach for mobilizing electoral support resides precisely in the ways it differs from the 
kind of politics that residents were accustomed to from their elected representatives. “Bread 
and butter” politics derives its legitimacy not from its association with the formal political 
system but rather from its submission to local realities and their logic of mutual support and 
care. In this process, voting can be understood not as an exercise in abstract or depersonalized 
rights, but rather as part of a personalized relationship: it confirms what Lazar (2004) has 
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called a relational view of political agency centered on reciprocal relations between people 
and politicians. The “bread and butter” approach is not unusual nor does it seem especially 
unique, rather with its emphasis on proximity over distance and on personalization over 
abstraction, it has been central to the ways in which people on the margins have appropriated 
electoral politics to their own ends in various places (e.g. Auyero 2000; Braconnier et. al. 
2013; Heredia and Palmeira 2013; James 2011).  
While we need to seriously consider politics as practiced by those on the margins, we must 
not lost sight of the difficulties of translating “bread and butter” politics into a sustained 
platform for collective action. This may well be less of a problem when dealing with electoral 
politics on a local level: in the UK, the localized nature of municipal elections (as opposed to 
general elections) has always allowed a greater space for such politics, as it has in other 
places (e.g. Grisaffi 2013; Medeiros 2001; Nonini et al. 2007). But when it comes to a more 
general politics of representation, “bread and butter” politics needs broader alliances to 
succeed. This was something that the members of the FWP were aware of in their own 
intention to build a movement that, ultimately, would be founded around issues of solidarity 
and class. Historically, it appears that “bread and butter” politics was most effective when 
institutional mechanisms and appropriate political channels were in place that legitimated 
localized demands and that could translate them into general policies of welfare and labor. As 
Evans (2012) has shown, working class support for the Labour Party in the post-war decades 
was mediated precisely through paternalistic housing policies that reinforced localized 
kinship and neighborhood connections rather than an abstract identification with party 
politics. 
Judged from this perspective, the failure of the FWP to build a sustained political alternative 
is perhaps most telling of the dismantling of the political left and the lack of legitimacy of 
working class politics in the current moment. As my case study has shown, a crucial factor in 
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explaining the downfall of the party was precisely its inability to establish itself as a publicly 
accepted alternative at a moment when mainstream politics has become de-captured from the 
voices and needs of the poor. When the FWP succeeded in being elected to the local council, 
it faced allegations of vigilante, anti-democratic, and even extremist practice – accusations 
that pushed the party into an isolated position. While these denunciations were part of the 
usual tit-for-tat that characterizes relations between political opponents and their parties, they 
also revealed so much more: they reflected the lack of political and institutional support for 
independent political movements and the difficulties facing alternatives to the political status 
quo. The FWP’s story draws attention to a broader point (Braconnier and Mayer 2015; 
Friedmann 2003; Gingrich and Banks 2005) – namely that a retreat to defensive populism 
may be only space left to working class people in the current political system.    
Given the lack of a political and ideological framework that can “scale up” and render 
legitimate the voices of alternative or independent movements, it may well be time to 
experiment with alternative democratic practices that do away with the system of 
representative democracy itself. Such is the suggestion of what may be called “alternative” or 
“active” democracies that have formed around Occupy and other recent protest movements 
(Butler 2011; Hardt and Negri 2011; Juris 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 2012) and that developed 
from earlier critiques of the alter-globalization movement (cf. Graeber 2009; Maeckelbergh 
2009). This approach suggests that received forms of representative democracy – chiefly 
elections – have become obsolete and should be replaced by horizontal network structures, 
including consensual decision-making and direct assemblies, as well as the use of social 
media including Twitter and Facebook as a means of mass communication. As Hardt and 
Negri (2011) put it: “If democracy – that is the democracy that we have been given – is 
staggering under the blows of the economic crisis and is powerless to assert the will and 
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interests of the multitude, then is now perhaps the moment to consider the form of democracy 
obsolete?” 
The analysis offered here is sympathetic to the premise that representative democracy is in 
crisis. I am less optimistic about the claim that the politics of Occupy are indicative of a new 
“politics-in-the-becoming” (Razsa and Kurnik 2012, 249) that allow citizens to articulate 
“shared visions and goals from the bottom up” (Juris 2012, 261). While this may well be the 
case for largely middle-class occupiers caught up in the spirit of protest, for many working 
class people the emphasis placed on form over practice, or process over substance, is far 
removed from their own reality of struggling for a “bread and butter” politics. As Shah puts 
it, “fantasies of the future need to be linked with the prosaic material workings of the present 
in order to analyse and resolve the contradictions in the present which prevent radical 
transformations from coming about” (2012, 350). The transnational character of Occupy, 
with its emphasis on building a global community of citizens, may well be antithetical to 
working class people’s concerns about localized communities and their position as embedded 
in place-based networks of support that have increasingly come under threat with neo-liberal 
housing policies and financial capitalization. Unless activists and scholars can adequately 
acknowledge and theorize these differences there is a danger that the recent protest 
movements will end up perpetuating class divides both in rhetoric and in practice – and in 
this process, forego the opportunity to redefine the conditions for more inclusive democratic 
futures.   
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1
 Authors have identified the racialized and gendered workings of post-war welfare policy 
(e.g. Lewis 1992; Patenam 1988). 
2
 This is a pseudonym. All names and the place of research have been made anonymous. 
3
 Indeed, one of the more senior party members once used the term disparagingly to refer to 
the politics practiced by the local MP on the estate. 
 35 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 The political system in the UK is made up of a two-tier system which encompasses national 
and local levels of governance. Each level furnishes its own political representatives and has 
its own elections: Members of Parliament (MPs) sit in the national Parliament and are elected 
every five years, while councilors sit in the local councils and are elected every four years. 
5
 All statistics are taken from the local city council’s website, which I have omitted from the 
list of references to preserve anonymity.  
6
 Residents who could not afford to pay the higher council housing rents had to rely on the 
private rental market, which meant they had very little protection from the welfare state.  
7
 The expenses scandal was a major political scandal in 2009 caused by information that was 
leaked of expense claims made by members of the Parliament over several years.  
8
 It has also set off processes of gentrification in parts of the estate. Given that my research is 
concerned only with the more established residents who have been left out of these processes, 
I have not focused on this aspect in the present paper.  
